“What effect has the near-certain re-election of some MEPs upon the input legitimacy of EU legislation?”

These MEPs are still elected after all – it’s that essentially people vote for a party that’s selected an individual. So the votes lead to a set of values represented in the EP, although not individuals at the electorate’s choosing.

Compare that with the situation in other Member States where lists are open and the electorate can choose the individual(s) they want, and that’s a better system – in terms of the diversity of views represented, and indeed (so it seems, anecdotally in Brussels) the quality of the MEPs that you get.

So – as best I can conclude – yes, the UK system does damage the input legitimacy of the EP to a certain extent. But it does not render the EP wholly illegitimate.

The question is: what effect has the near-certain re-election of some MEPs upon the input legitimacy of EU legislation?

Do you deny that the one undermines the other?

We both seem to agree that the input legitimacy of EU legislation is a function of all the elements of the EU legislature: Parliament, Council and Commission. You seem to want to refuse to discuss this analytically (in the strict sense of breaking something down into its constituent parts, though obviously to some extent one has to consider the interaction between these three parts). You keep saying “well, what about the effect upon legitimacy of [something other than MEPs' incentives]“.

Now as to the European Union… Ask yourself this: which of the 3 main institutions: EP, Council or Commission has the greatest legitimacy, bearing in mind all the shortcomings you’ve listed? Both the EP and Council have some degree of legitimacy that could be improved in both cases – if on the one hand EP elections were fought on European questions, and on the Council side if Member State Parliaments bothered to scrutinize properly. Following from that, if the other institutions are more legitimate, and they appoint the Commission, then you’re reaching something that should be broadly acceptable…

The input legitimacy here is, as you say, some function of the roles of the Commission, Council and Parliament, but you can’t pretend that it’s somehow irreducible and immune to analysis. The Parliament’s contribution is perfectly capable of being discussed even if it is not the whole story.

My assessment is that the Commission has no democratic mandate whatsoever in respect of the generality of legislative proposals it initiates. I had a question asked in the Parliament about the democratic mandate for two specific measures, and all they condescended to say was that they had the legal authority to pursue the measures, which is to refuse to answer the question. The UK Government has the legal authority to enact a highly regressive income tax or legalise fox hunting, but quite the opposite of a democratic mandate to do so.

The Council and attendant institutions operate largely unscrutinised by national parliaments (practice varies widely), and sometimes in formal defiance of the scrutiny reserve, and sometimes even in secret. In general, EU members are parliamentary democracies whose executives are not directly electorally accountable, and whose conduct of external relations is among the least reviewable of their activities. I believe it unusual for parties (at least in the UK) to campaign in national elections on their proposed actions in Council.

So now back to the EU Parliament: what is the effect on the input legitimacy of EU legislation as a whole, given the near-guaranteed status of some members by “virtue” of closed lists? Obviously the UK stands as one of the world’s best examples of a democracy with unelected politicians (I appreciate that you would prefer it were unelected politicians restricted to … err … the upper echelons of the Civil Service). Yet we have the Parliament Acts, and strong norms of deference to the elected chamber. In other countries, however, even this excuse doesn’t obtain. You can point at national law and say it ought to be obeyed because everyone had a chance to influence it through their vote, but you can’t say that as strongly in the case of EU law. The legislative outcome may satisfy an EU-wide majority (the Byzantine legislative procedures must be credited for achieving that), but for the minority, you can’t demand their loyalty in the same way as you can in polities where democratic control is considerably tighter.

I can’t give a reference but I am pretty certain there was an obligation to have a proportional system before 1999 – as I recall those of us arguing for the move to a PR system, referring to this. It may have been in one of the treaties, but it might just have been another Council declaration.

There are mainly two sides in the debate
pro-closed lists: because open lists rise the costsof electoral campaigns and the ties with organized crime
against-closed lists: because closed lists are made by party executives which can decide who will be elected and who not (the same reasoning of Jon)

I think the solution is quite easy: primary elections. The advantages of this solution is that it can be implemented even by single parties without the need of reforming the electoral law and that it doesn’t increae the costs of electoral campaigns.
About the ties with organized crime I think, at least in Italy, it doen’s change too much if th listes are closed or not, unfortunatly ties are strong anyway…

It’s a bit tricky to answer that point clearly as far as I’m concerned, as the Commission proposed the legislation and it’s then co-decided with the Council. The EP putting its foot down and rejecting something outright is quite rare, while their legitimacy in terms of amending legislation is reasonable – they look at matters in depth, vote detailed reports etc.

Let’s also pose the question the other way round. Does the EP have a more legitimate legislative role than the Council of the EU does. In my opinion, even with the shortcomings above, yes, it does. MEPs’ job is to legislate on EU issues, and one way or another European Parliament elections should be about EU matters. Conversely few of the Ministers in Council were elected nationally according to their take on EU issues.

I think you could probably argue that a backbench MP in Westminster has more legislative legitimacy than a MEP, but perhaps that a MEP is better than a local councillor in this regard…?