The country needed to raise money to pay for the ransom of King Richard, the peasants were taxed and then Robin stole the money back so the peasants had to be taxed harsher in order to still pay the ransom.

Now if we look at the current situation country needed to raise money to pay for the banks to do their very important work, like Robin Hood the Government wants to steal back some of the money they have given to the banks, which will then require the banks to ask for more money.

In concluding both Robin Hood and the Robin Hood Tax might seem popular but they both have little if any benefit.

This is not to say that there is no need to curb risk-promoting incentives or moral hazard in the financial sector, on the contrary. But it is better to reduce those by targetting them directly, e.g. to make excessive risk-taking more expensive by increasing the costs of leverage (increasing capital requirement ratios), or to reduce moral hazard by making sure that failing bankers (and failing banks) pay for the costs they cause to society. Not by bluntly reducing the efficiency of the entire sector by putting a charge on all transactions, whatever their actual effect on the stability of the sector.

But I’m with David : Tobin Hood seems like a good compromise.

Tobin Hood Tax? as compromise